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PAYING OUR OWN WAY: THE PRIVATIZATION OF
THE CHILEAN SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM AND ITS
LESSONS FOR AMERICAN REFORM
KRISTEN V. CAMPANA*
"The country needs and, unless I mistake its temper, the
country demands .bold, persistent experimentation. It is
common sense to take a method and try it; if it fails, admit
it frankly and try another. But above all, try something."1
1. INTRODUCTION
To say that the American Social Security system is in crisis is
a vast understatement. In fact, a survey of eighteen to thirty-four
year olds revealed that while 46% believed in UFOs, only 28%
thought that Social Security would pay benefits when they retire.2
Many fear that the system, as it stands today, will be unable to
support retired workers thirty-five years from now,3 and that the
only way to ensure a financially secure retirement is through ad-
* J.D. Candidate, 1999, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A.,
1996, Binghamton University. I would like to thank Scully and JoAnn Cam-
pana, and Kenny and Jennifer Schaefer for their continual encouragement and
support, as well as the Journal editors for their hard work.
1 Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt, Speech, Campaign Address at 01-
gethorpe University (May 22, 1932), in N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1932, at 6.
2 See 141 CONG. REc. S5018 (daily ed. Mar. 31, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Moynihan). Although the survey overly simplifies a very complicated issue,
the lack of public confidence in the present social security system is not un-
founded, as discussed infra Section 5.
3 See 144 CONG. REC. S6004 (daily ed. June 10, 1998) (statement of Sen.
Wellstone). In his January 1999 State of the Union Address, President Bill
Clinton discussed his proposal to salvage Social Security, which he believes will
keep it solvent until 2055. See Saving Social Security Now and Meeting America's
Challenges for the 21st Century (visited Apr. 1, 1999) <http://
www.whitehouse.gov/wh/SOTU99/sss.html>. For a more detailed analysis
of Clinton's proposed plan, see infra Section 6.
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ditional, independent investments made throughout an individ-
ual's lifetime.
Baby Boomers, for whom the Social Security crisis is immi-
nent, have dealt with the uncertain future of the system largely
through such independent investments.4 Yet, it is unclear that
they have prepared for the elevated healthcare costs that result
from increased lifetime longevity.' Many intend to remain in the
labor force well past the traditional retirement age of sixty-five,
possibly due to the uncertain future of retirement benefits.6 To-
day, individuals entering the workforce must inevitably create
their own portfolio of investments and individual retirement ac-
counts ("IRAs"), as it is doubtful that Social Security will ade-
quately provide the funds necessary to cover rising healthcare
costs and other expenses.
As the system currently functions, the 15.4% of employee
earnings that are contributed to Social Security trust funds are
immediately disbursed to present beneficiaries. The government
issues the contributing workers a promise of future payment (an
IO), which provides a low rate of return.7 As one commentator
criticized:
The Treasury leaves IOUs that pay only about 2.2 percent
- a very poor rate of return. And then when pay-back
time comes, the Treasury has no way to get the money
but to call for higher taxes or more borrowing. That is al-
4 According to a study conducted by Scudder Kemper Investments, the
majority of Baby Boomers remain uncertain whether Social Security will ade-
quately fund their retirement. See Scudder Kemper Investments Baby Boomer
Survey Identfies Major Public Policy Issues Ahead, BUSINESS WIRE (Boston), Feb.
16, 1998, available in America Online. The poll was conducted by Dr. Chris-
topher Hayes, Professor of Psychology and Executive Director of the National
Center for Women and Retirement Research ("NCWRR") at Southampton
College of Long Island University. The poll reported that 40% of over 1000
Boomers polled resign themselves to reduced benefits, while 24% do not think
that they ill receive any benefits at all. Only 2% believe that Social Security
is the most important factor for enjoying a financially secure retirement. See
a e .
I See id.
6 See id
7 See generally Lee Anderson, Better Than Social Security, CHATTANOOGA
FREE PRESS, May 30, 1998, at A4.
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ready costing taxpayers about 15 percent of the annual
federal budget!
Thus, not only does Social Security face an uncertain future; it is
presently an inefficient means for managing funds that could be
otherwise better invested.
Social Security figures prominently in the national political
agenda, and the possibilities for system reform have been hotly
debated on Capitol Hill for years. In his January 1999 State of
the Union Address, President Clinton set out a detailed plan for
the reform of Social Security.9 Clinton's plan calls for the private
investment of government funds for the benefit of the system.
Specifically, it proposes to "commit sixty percent of the budget
surplus for the next 15 years to Social Security, investing a small
portion in the private sector just as any private or state govern-
ment pension would do.""0
Clinton's privatization scheme is not a unique approach to
Social Security reform. For example, in 1997, the Advisory
Council on Social Security" presented three recommendations for
"restoring the long-range actuarial balance of the OASDI [Old-
Age Survivors and Disability Insurance Trust Fund] program.""
. Id. Anderson also notes that three counties in Texas (Galveston, Bra-
zoria, and Matagorda) established their own privately managed system because
they found a now-closed loophole allowing them to legally opt out of Social
Security. The privately managed systems created benefits higher than those of
the Social Security system without an immediate threat of bankruptcy. See id.;
see also Opting Out in Oregon, WASH. TIMES, May 12, 1997, at A16 (discussing
a vote by Oregon legislators that urges Congress to permit the use of waivers
for its residents to opt out of the Social Security systein).
9 See President William J. Clinton, State of the Union Address (1999), in
America Is Working Again, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1999, at A22.
10 Id.
n See H.R. Doc. No. 105-72 (1997), available in 1997 OASDI Trustees Re-
port (visited Apr. 7, 1999) <http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR97/trtoc.
html>. On June 9, 1994, the Secretary of Health and Human Services an-
nounced the appointment of an Advisory Council on Social Security under the
provisions of Section 706 of the Social Security Act which were effective before
the enactment of Public Law 103-296. This is the last Advisory Council to be
appointed according to Public Law 103-296. The Council consisted of a Chair
and 12 members representing the employers and employees, the self-employed,
and the public. At the request of the Secretary, the Council specifically exam-
ined Social Security financing. The Council submitted its report on January 6,
1997. See id.
12 Id.
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The first proposal would maintain the current Social Security and
tax structure, allocating a portion of the trust-fund assets to pri-
vate equity investment managed by the federal government. 3
The second proposal would privatize a significant portion of cur-
rently held funds by "directing 5 percentage points of each
worker's contributions... to a 'Personal Security Account.'"14
The third proposal would uniformly reduce benefits to "levels
that could be financed by the current 12.4 percent contribution
rate.""5 This last approach also establishes contribution benefit
plans, or "Individual Accounts," for each worker, funded through
an additional 1.6% mandatory contribution paid to an investment
account managed by the federal government.
16
Like Clinton's proposal, all three of the Advisory Committee
recommendations involve some form of privatization for the So-
cial Security System. This emphasis on privatization is a new
trend in the United States and has just recently been seriously
considered by the federal government. 7  Much of the public
seems to echo the U.S. government's interest in privatization.
According to a Scudder Kemper report, "[s]ixty percent of Boom-
ers studied believe that Social Security should be privatized.""8
Despite its popularity with many groups, however, privatization
is not uniformly embraced. 9
This Comment contends that the U.S. Social Security system
should be partially privatized. In support of this argument, it ex-
amines the Chilean privatized Social Security system and evalu-
ates the possibility of U.S. implementation of the Chilean model.
While Chile's privatization has been largely successful, its benefits
13 See id.
14 Id.
15 Id. A contribution rate is the amount each worker contributes to Social
Security through payroll taxes. See id.
16 See id
17 Scudder Kemper Investments, supra note 4.
18 See id
19 See 20/20: Retired and Rich (ABC television broadcast, Nov. 28, 1997)
(reporting and interviewing by John Stossel). In the report, Stossel interviews
Chile's former Minister of Labor, Jose Pinera, who lectures in the United
States and advocates the privatized pension system that he created in Chile in
1980. Stossel notes that the option to privatize was not being taken seriously
by most legislators, and that lobbyist groups, such as the Grey Panthers, are
arguing vehemently against privatization. See id.
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have not come without costs.2' Additionally, disparities between
the United States' present financial and political climates, and
conditions in Chile during its privatization in the 1980s, must be
considered when deciding whether to follow Chile's example.21
Differences aside, if the United States chooses to privatize its So-
cial Security system, an examination of the Chilean model could
prove helpful. While implementation in the United States of a
system identical to Chile's is probably unfeasible, the "partial pri-
vatization" approach of the Advisory Committee' should be ad-
hered to with certain changes added to maintain a baseline level of
Social Security benefits.
2. CHILE'S POLmcAL AND ECONOMIC PROFILE BEFORE 1980
Colonial rulers developed Chile's first pension system under
the Spanish Crown, but it was rather incomprehensive and unso-
phisticated.' After gaining independence from Spanish rule, the
new government established limited pensions for the military in
the 1820s.2' Around the turn of the twentieth century, Chile cre-
ated a pension system for government workers and a few very po-
litically influential groups, such as laborers in the state-owned
railroad company.' The government left the vast majority of
workers without pensions until the Mexican Revolution of 1917
"spurred the labor movement in Chile and the adoption of a new
Constitution."2 In 1924, despite significant dissent in the Sen-
20 See infra Section 4.2.
2 See infra Section 5. The general instability of the Chilean government,
which continued with the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s, has been
cited as part of Chile's political background that helped to enable it to privatize
its Social Security system. See Peter Diamond & Salvador Valdes-Prieto, Social
Security Reforms, in THE CHILEAN EcONOMY: POLICY LESSONS AND
CHALLENGES 257 (Barry P. Bosworth, et al. eds., 1994); Michael Alan Paskin,
Note, Privatization of Old-Age Pensions in Latin America: Lessons for Social Se-curity Reform in the United States, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 2199, 2219 (1994) (stat-
ing that the "Latin American models, however, do not show conclusively
whether privatization can work as a plan for social security reform in an indus-
trial nation with a mature economy such as the United States").
2 SeeH.R. DOc. No. 105-72,supra note 11.
2 See id at 268-69.
24 See id. at 269.
See CARMELO MESA-LAGO, SOCIAL SECURrrY IN LATIN AMERICA:
PRESSURE GROUPS, STRATIFICATION, AND INEQUALITY 23-24 (1978).
26 Paskin, supra note 21, at 2205.
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ate,' President Arturo Alessandri Palma forced the Chilean Con-
gress to adopt laws that mandated contributions to pensions by
all private firms.28 The laws allowed each employer to create its
own pension regime, and to continue any plans that were already
in existence.29 Separate social security institutions ("SSIs") were
created for blue-collar and white-collar workers. Under this sys-
tem, blue-collar workers typically received benefits at age fifty-
five, sixty, or sixty-five (regardless of gender), while white-collar
workers usually received benefits after thirty-five years of work.3
Some industry-related pensions, however, were based on years of
service, often correlated to the danger involved in the job.31 In-
dustries created their own pension systems, but the systems were
regulated and managed by governmental agencies.32
The next wave of pension reform swept Chile in 1952, when
the system appeared to be insufficient and, probably more impor-
tantly, inefficient to administer.33 The contribution rate was very
low between 1924 and 1952: 5% for blue-collar workers and 10%
for white-collar workers.' Substantial surpluses accumulated and
were placed in government bonds, apartment buildings, and haci-
endas, but these investments performed poorly." The Great De-
pression brought about inflation in Chile where, in 1932, prices
doubled and the real value of the government bond portfolio held
by SSIs fell by 50%.36 In an attempt to prevent poor investing,
legislation limited SSI investment opportunities by forbidding
SSIs to invest in industrial firms. Haciendas became unprofitable
27 See id
28 See Diamond & Vald6s-Prieto, supra note 21, at 269.
29 See iii
30 See id
31 For example, mining only required fifteen years of work before receiv-
ing pension benefits. See . .
32 See CARMELO MESA-LAGO, ASCENT TO BANKRUPTCY: FINANCING
SOCIAL SECURITY IN LATIN AMERICA 107-09 (1989). For example, the petro-
leum industry had its own pension benefit government agency that adininis-
trated the funds for the particular industry workers. Thus, the benefits re-
ceived by employees in clifferent industries were entirely independent from
other benefit programs. See id.
33 See Diamond & Vald6s-Prieto, supra note 21, at 270.
3 See id. at 269.
35 See id.
36 See id.
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due to tariff policies."a As a result, "in the period 1947-52 invest-
ment income represented only 8.67 percent of total income for
the civilian SSIs."38
In 1952, the government merged all workers into a pay-as-
you-go system. 9 While some reports suggest that the system
functioned similarly to the present U.S. Social Security system,
40
the differences between the two cannot be overlooked. The re-
formed Chilean system of the 1950s separated the health insur-
ance system from the pension systems and allowed blue-collar
workers to receive their pensions as annuities starting at age sixty-
five. It also created a uniform annuity system for white-collar
workers, although they were still permitted to take the benefits
after thirty-five years of service. 4' Even with the changes, "the
two large government-controlled SSIs obtained a rate of return
much lower than that of the older, privately managed SSIs. "42
3. CHILE's PRIVATIZATION OF THE PENSION SYSTEM AND THE
CREATION OF ADMINISTRADORAS DE FONDOs
DE PENSIONES ("AFPs")
In the 1970's, the Chilean system experienced yet another
overhaul of its pension benefit plans. 43 In 1973, before the mili-
37 See id.
38 Id.
39 See id. at 270.
40 See 20/20: Retired and Ricb, supra note 19.
41 See Diamond & Valdes-Prieto, supra note 21, at 270-71.
42 Id. at 272. Diamond and Vald6s-Prieto discuss at great length the finan-
cial difficulties that the Chilean government created in its attempt to unify the
pension system. "A calculation for the 1950-77 period shows that the real
ralue of assets held increased by 804 percent for privately managed SSIs and
only 57 percent for the large public SSIs." Id. (quoting statistics from C.
WALLICH, SAVINGS MOBII/ZATION THROUGH SOCIAL SECURITY (World
Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 553, 1983)). Other problems in-
cluded the fact that although the contributions were very high, almost 70% of
pensions in 1979 were minimum pensions subsidized by the state. See id. Fur-
ther, the politics of those who were in power often had a significant impact on
who received pensions. This is a very common problem in pay-as-you-go sys-
tems, but when there is a very unstable government, such as in many Latin
American countries, the risk becomes all-encompassing. See Paskin, supra note
21, at 2206. The new system did not ameliorate the problems which plagued
the administration of pensions because, in the 1970s, there were still 31 sepa-
rate old-age pensions in the system, the functioning of which represented 17%
of Chile's gross national product ("GDP"). See id.
" See Paskin, supra note 21, at 2206.
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tary coup of General Augosto Pinochet," a group of economists
under the Frei government diagnosed the problems of the existing
system and proposed overall reforms, known as the "brick."
45
The "brick" reforms called for an innovative capitalization of the
system that included:
separation of the income redistribution and insurance
functions; the options of lump-sum withdrawal and annu-
ity purchase; replacement of legislated rules by contractual
rules in fund management; nonnationalized [sic] fund
management organized along the lines of savings and loans
associations, with investment of contributions in bonds
and equities issued by the private sector; and full privatiza-
tion of the selection of provider.46
Pinochet's military coup in 1973 did not hinder these reforms.
Instead, the newly empowered government followed the guide-
lines of the "brick," and began to implement its measures of re-
form during the years 1974-79. 4'
More impressive and important than the actual privatization
of the system under the "brick" was the restructuring of Chile's
financial capacities in preparation for the new system. For the re-
forms to succeed, the government had to invest large amounts of
money and energy.4" Instead of transitioning through debt fi-
nancing, which would have created a significant budget deficit,
the government decided to build a budget surplus.49
The Chilean budget surplus was derived from several sources.
A "value added tax on consumption" created close to half of the
surplus by raising general revenues."0 Synchronizing the privati-
" In 1973, General Augosto Pinochet overthrew the government through
a military coup. See id at 2207. The military dictatorship that ensued allowed
the government to overcome the pressure groups, unions, and political parties
that stood in the way of real reform. See id.
" See Diamond & Vald&s-Prieto, supra note 21, at 273. See generally
CENTROS DE ESTUDIOS PUBLiCOS, THE BRICK, EL LADRiLLO: BASES DE LA
POLiTICA ECONOMICA DEL GOBIERNO MILTARIO CHILENO (Santiago, Chile).
6Diamond & Valdes-Prieto, supra note 21, at 273.
4 See Paskin, supra note 21, at 2207.
48 See: 20/20: Retired and Rich, supra note 19.
4 See Diamond and Valdes-Prieto, supra note 21, at 273-74.
so Id. at 281.
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zation of the social security system with other parts of the econ-
omy also funded the transition."1 The sale of state assets, shares of
which were purchased by pension funds, helped to generate reve-
nues. 2 Reducing expenditures, borrowing, issuing domestic debt,
and reducing the benefits under the old system through the adop-
tion of a higher retirement age further assisted the production of
surplus. 3
As soon as Chile recovered from the recession of 1975, a plan
of fiscal tightening was imposed.'s This program attempted to re-
duce the growth rate of public consumption (wages plus con-
sumer purchases of goods and services) over a lengthy period of
time. Pinochet's dictatorial military rule notwithstanding, the
economic boom that followed the recession of the mid-'70s was
necessary for the creation of a viable surplus through the afore-
mentioned investment and sale opportunities."5 Outside investors
and the restructuring of Chile's debt helped the country to pros-
per and created a surplus to finance the pensions.5 6
Pinochet's military control is often considered responsible for
the successful implementation of this effort,'7 because it elimi-
nated all opposition from the old Congress and political groups.
Pinochet's dictatorship was able to coordinate the efforts of all
the branches of government and all administrative bodies in order
to execute the plans without significant conflict. 8
In addition to creating a surplus, Chile adopted uniform rules
to index the pensions consistently. 9 This was a departure from
the existing indexing rules, which benefited the elite and politi-
cally influential at the expense of the average citizen. Also, be-
cause the government eliminated the "years of service" require-
ment for civilians, all workers received their pensions at the same
time, at ages sixty-five for men and sixty for women.' Finally,
the most controversial, albeit the most important, part of the
51 See id.
52 See id.
53 See id
54 See id at 273.
5 See id at 273-74.
56 See Jean A. Briggs, A Political Miracle, FORBES, May 11, 1992, at 108.
51 See Diamond & Vald&s-Prieto, supra note 21, at 273-74.
58 See id. at 274.
59 See id.
6 See id
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"brick" to be implemented by statute was the privatization of all
pensions.6
3.1. Basic Structure of the Privatized Pension Program
A number of key features of the new system helped to create a
savings element as well as a personal capitalization component,
which distinguished it from pay-as-you-go systems. The govern-
ment listed a number of goals for its agenda, including: (1) creat-
ing a financially stable system; (2) developing a system which in-
spired confidence; (3) offering personal capitalization and control
over personal accounts; and (4) preventing fraud and the influence
of political actors capable of altering the benefits scheme.62
To this end, the Chilean government in 1980, led by its Minis-
ter of Labor and Social Welfare, Dr. Jose Pinera,63 created a sys-
tem of pensions "based on individual capitalization of retirement
accounts invested with private pension fund managers, who were
called Administratadoras de Fondos de Pensiones"" (Pension
Fund Administrators) or AFPs. The Chilean AFP system cov-
ered private sector and government employees, but excluded
members of the armed forces.
Under this system, a worker selects one of the heavily regu-
lated AFPs in which to invest the mandatory 10% contribution
from his or her salary.6" Additionally, each employee must con-
tribute about 3% to the pension fund for group life and disability
61 See Decree Law 3,500 (Chile 1980) which created the statutory frame-
work of the privatized pension system.
See Diamond & Valdes-Prieto, supra note 21, at 274.
63 Dr. Jose Pinera, a Harvard Ph.D. economist, was the founder of the
AFP system in Chile while he served as its Minister of Labor and Social Wel-
fare from 1978 to 1980. He later served as Minister of Mining in Chile. He is
currently the President of The International Center for Pension Reform, fre-
quently speaking in the United States and elsewhere (he was influential m pri-
vatizing other Latin American countries' pension systems) on behalf of the
privatization of pensions. Dr. Pinera is actively involved in Chilean politics,
representing a Chilean community in the government as well as running for
president of Chile in 1993. He is the author of four books and several articles.
See THE INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR PENSION REFORM, TE CHILEAN
PRIVATE PENSION SYSTEM (Santiago, Chile).
4 Paskin, supra note 21, at 2207.
65 See Tom Fenton, Chile to Turn Social Security Over to Private Enterprise,
Assoc. PRESS, Nov. 6, 1980 (quoting Labor Minister, Dr. JosePinera, as stat-
ing The 10 percent figure will permit a worker to retire on a pension equal to
hi final salary.").
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insurance coverage bought by AFPs from private insurance com-
panies.6 On top of the mandatory 13%, a worker may invest an-
other 10% of his or her salary as a form of voluntary savings. 7
The government withholds another 7% of income to finance
medical insurance." The health system is separate from the AFP,
and workers may choose between private and public healthcare
systems. 9 The worker's contributions are entirely tax deducti-
ble,70 and the money invested in the AFP is taxed upon retire-
ment withdrawal at a preferential rate.71
The pension portion of the AFP is a type of savings account
belonging to the individual that "will not be taken for any other
purpose than his pension, nor will it be redistributed in favor of
other workers, nor revert to the state. Funds that remain in a
worker's account after his death form a part of his estate."' A
worker's pension fund is fully portable,' so when one changes
jobs there is no need to change the account. Additionally, work-
ers may change AFPs up to four times per year.74
Upon retirement, an individual has three options: (1) opting
for programmed retirement under an AFP,75 making regular, lim-
ited withdrawals; 76 (2) choosing to "buy an annuity from an in-
surance company (with provisions for beneficiaries); r  or (3) se-
lecting "a combination of the two, i.e., a temporary income with
6THE INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR PENSION REFORM, supra note 63, at
4. This insurance further provides benefits to widows and orphans as well as
insurance against premature death, permanent disability, and other"accidents."
67 See id. at 3.
68 See id.
69 See id. at 4.
70 See Jose Pinera, Chileans Unravel Social-Security Tangle, WALL ST. J., Jan.
3, 1986, at A13.
71 See THE INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR PENSION REFORM, supra note
63, at 4.
' Id. Each account holder receives a passbook to keep track of his pension
account. To simplify the management of the account, each passbook holder
can use a computer terminal at the branch office of the AFP to calculate how
much money that he/she needs to invest each month in order to retire when
desired. See Pinera, supra note 70; JULIo BUSTMENTE GERALDO, SOCIAL
SECURITY REFORM IN CHILE 5 (1992).
7 See Pinera, supra note 70.
'+ See BuSTMENTE GERALDO, supra note 72, at 5.
7- See id at 7.
76 See Pinera, supra note 70.
77 Ti
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a deferred annuity."'8 A fully funded pension at retirement
(sixty-five for men or sixty for women) will have 70% of a
worker's final salary, plus survivor's benefits.7 9 Workers with
enough savings to fund a pension at 50% of their salary level may
take early retirement without penalty."0 For those who do not
have enough money in their accounts by retirement to buy a
specified minimum annuity, general tax revenues subsidize the
difference."1
As incorporated private enterprises," AFPs compete with one
another in the pension fund market,8 3 and distribute their profits
among their shareholders (the account holders).4 AFPs are di-
verse in their corporate structure," yet have similar rates of re-
turn on the various funds due to regulations that strictly limit the
types of investment vehicles the funds may utilize."
Some AFPs are insurance or banking conglomerates (interna-
tional financial companies including Aetna, CIGNA, and Banco
Santader), while others are publicly-traded corporations listed on
the Chilean stock exchange." These corporations may not engage
in any business other than pension fund investment and admini-
stration. AFPs may only withdraw 1% from thepgension fund
to finance its operational costs.8 9 This commission must be de-
78 BUSTMENTE GERALDO, supra note 72, at 7.
79 See THE INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR PENSION REFORM, supra note
63, at 5.
10 See id. at 5.
8" See Pinera, supra note 70.
82 See BUSTMENTE GERALDO, supra note 72, at 6.
83 See Pinera, supra note 70.
84 See BUSTMENTE GERALDO, supra note 72, at 6.
8s See THE INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR PENSION REFORM, supra note
63, at 8.
86 See Saul Hansall, The New Wave in Old-Age Pensions, INSTITrTIONAL
INVESTOR, Nov. 1992, at 77, 81; see also Paskin, supra note 21, at 2208 & n.76.
17 See THE INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR PENSION REFORM, supra note
63, at 8. Some AFPs are El Libertador S.A., Invierta S.A., Magister S.A.,
Provida S.A., Santa Maria S.A., Summa S.A., Union S.A.,Aeroperu Empresa
de Transporte Aereo del Peru, Agencia de Aduana Arturo Fernandez S. Y Cia.
Ltda., Agencia de Aduana Diego Tobar & Cia. Ltda., Agencia de Aduana Ed-
mundo Munoz Flores, Agencia de Aduana Eduardo Mewes Y Cia. Ltda., Ban-
guardia S.A., Bansander S.A., Concordia S.A., Cuprum S.A., Seguridad Ltda.,
Planvital S.A., Qualitas S.A., and Habitat S.A. See BusTMENTE GERALDO, su-
pra note 72, at 10-12.
88 See BUSTMENTE GERALDO, supra note 72, at 6.
89 See id.
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posited into the Central Bank as a "guarantee," where it is in-
vested into "instruments guaranteeing the management of re-
sources... [that] also yield a profit to the AFPs."9' This limit on
withdrawals ensures that the funds do not use their revenues to
unjustly enrich a company, its owners, or its employees.
A number of safeguards protect against abuse of Chile's pri-
vatized pension system. AFPs may invest only in certain types of
investment instruments.' Both the instruments and the issuing
agency must be diversified in order to spread the risk.93 At first,
the pension funds could only invest in low-risk, domestic finan-
cial instruments.94 Now they also may invest up to "30% of their
portfolios in widely owned Chilean blue-chip stocks and shares of
state-owned enterprises, which the government has begun to pri-
vatize mainly through the new pension system."' As of 1994,
the total pension funds of US$22.3 billion were invested in the
following manner:96
39.4% in State instruments, the margin being 45%
32.7% in stocks
6.4% in commercial bonds
12.8% in mortgage paper
5.9% in time deposits in financial institutions
2.8% others (bonds and foreign instruments)
Presently, the Chilean government is changing its policy to al-
low AFPs to invest more heavily in foreign instruments. Inter-
estingly, the AFPs have not pursued this option at great length
yet.98 Quite possibly, they are satisfied with the results of their
domestic investing.' The Chilean economy has remained rela-
9o See i.
91 Id.
9 See Pinera, supra note 70.
9' See i.
9' See Pinera, supa note 70 (indicating some other types of investments
they may now pursue).
95 Id
96 BUsTMENTE GERALDO, supra note 72, at 9.
97 See id.
98 See id.
99 See 143 CONG. REc. H672 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1997) (address of His Ex-
cellency, Eduardo Frei, President of the Republic of Chile stating, "The
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tively stable, and with disastrous examples, such as the Asian
market crisis, fund managers may be wary of investing in foreign
instruments. Additionally, Latin American investment opportu-
nities are still abundant since many countries are still in the proc-
ess of restructuring their debt through the privatization of infra-
structure and utility projects. These investments appear to be less
risky than "unknown" foreign opportunities. Also, the state
guarantees many of the domestic instruments to a certain degree,
so, if their value plummets, the government would be obligated
to make up at least part of the difference. Whether or not the
government could in fact "make up the loss" is an open question,
but for the AFPs some degree of guarantee is better than none.
4. EVALUATION OF THE CHILEAN PENSION EXPERIMENT
The Chilean pension privatization system has generated a
great deal of interest and emulation in Latin America; Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Columbia, Peru, Uruguay, and, most recently,
Mexico"°° have all adopted similar systems. The applause has not
come without some criticism, however. The privatization proc-
ess is expensive, and there is some debate as to whether it should
be funded through debt financing or tax increases."' Tax financ-
ing is uniformly unpopular with the public, but debt financing
would increase the federal deficit. In addition to the funding in-
quiry, a number of critics assert that allowing individuals with lit-
tle experience to make investments in the volatile stock market is
not only poor economic policy but also fraudulent insofar as it
takes advantage of uninformed consumers. 2
amount deposited today equals 40% of GNP and is diversified in the broad in-
vestment portfolio. Profits have averaged 12.2% annually since its incep-
tion.").
100 See Frida Modak, Mito y Realidad de las Afores en AL, EL ExcELSIOR
(Mexico), June 30, 1997; see also Social Security: U.S. Should Copy Mexico's Tenta-
tive Reform, DALLAS MORNING NEWS: HOME FINAL ED., Dec. 14, 1995, at
37A (comparing the crisis state of the United States' Social Security system to
that of pre-privatization Mexico and noting that the Social Security administra-
tion estimates "[t]he point at which Washington must start raism taxes (or
cutting benefits) to keep the federal deficit from growing could arrive as early
as 1999. ... ").
101 See 20/20: Retired and Rich, supra note 19.
102 See id. (depicting economists' criticism of Dr. Pinera's views on the suc-
cess of the pension system).
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4.1. Advantages of the Chilean Private Pension System
Regardless of the critics' views, the Chilean system has many
advantages, including the following: (1) reducing the "incentives
to underreport income or to evade the system entirely;" (2) giving
workers a stake in and authority over their future; (3) creating
greater equity due to the lack of differential treatment by occupa-
tion; (4) eliminating any possibility of government redistributions
of the funds; and (5) providing larger retirement benefits. 3 The
system has allowed "higher net wages, lower labor costs, and re-
duced government spending." 104
Advocates of the Chilean pension system note that Chileans
initially voluntarily contributed to the system.' When the gov-
ernment first implemented the system, people elected whether or
not to join; if workers chose to move into the new system, they
received a "recognition bond" payable to their account upon re-
tirement that equaled the old system."' Of the 2 million eligible
workers, 1.5 million joined within the first year of the system."
By 1995, over 4.5 million workers had AFP accounts,' and ap-
proximately 740,000 of these workers had voluntary savings ac-
counts within the system, which accounted for an additional
US$260 million in assets.1c 9 Today, more than 93% of the work-
ers who were in the old system have transferred to the new sys-
tem.10
The Mexican working population similarly supported a pri-
vatized system in their country in 1997."' Although the Mexican
government does not require eligible workers to fully invest in
103 Lewis D. Solomon & Geoffrey A. Barrow, Privatization of Social Secu-
rity:A Legal and Policy Analysis, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 9, 21-22 (1995).
104 Id. at 22.
105 See Pinera, supra note 70. "The bottom line is that when given the
choice, workers will vote with their money overwhelmingly for the free mar-
ket- even when it comes to such sacred cows as social security." Id.
106 See id.
107 See id
log See ida
109 See THE INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR PENSION REFORM, supra note
63, at 9.
10 See BUSTMENTE GERALDO, supra note 72, at 4. As of January 1983, all
workers entering the workforce for the first time were forced to enter the pri-
vatized pension system. See id.
... See Jorge Zambrano Gonzalez, Afores: Demanden que no Limitar Deduc-
cionporAportaciones Voluntarias, EL ECONOMISTA (Mexico), Nov. 13, 1997.
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the new system until 2001, more than eight million Mexicans
(73% of those eligible) switched from a pay-as-you-go system to
the Afores (the Mexican equivalent of the AFP) immediately.
11 2
In Latin America, privatized pensions have generally provided
positive growth for citizens' investments. The private pensions in
Latin America contain US$130,000 billion and increase approxi-
mately US$1,000 billion each month."' In Chile, investment in
the local economy through the privatized pensions fueled the
economic boom that the country recently enjoyed. Initially, pen-
sion funds were only able to invest in local financial instruments;
today, most Chilean local projects have been financed by the pen-
sions.
In ten years, the AFPs "have accumulated more than US$10
billion, some 30% of the nation's gross domestic product." 4
This capital accumulation and AFP investment result from steady
contributions and "very high real rates of return," that averaged
14.5% from July 1981 to July 1992.115 Partially as a result of the
privatized pension fund investments, the overall financial stand-
ing of Chile has improved greatly. In 1996, the country experi-
enced a GDP growth rate of 6.7% which was "driven by exports,
investment, and domestic demand .... "116 This followed a GDP
rate of 6% between 1986 and 1994.117
Although Chile invests a great deal in education, social secu-
rity, and infrastructure projects, the public sector budget "will
register a surplus equal to 1.2% of GDP, due in large part to de-
clining interest and social security payments."1 Additionally,
Chile's savings rate (the highest in Latin America), 9 in addition
to its investment rate, continues to increase while annual inflation
continues to fall overall.'
112 See Chris Kraul, Mexicans Run to Private Pension Funds, THE L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 17, 1997.
113 See Aumenta Financiamento de AL Mediante Fondos Locales, EL
ECONOMISTA (Mexico), Sept. 30, 1997.
114 Id.
"1 Diamond & Valdes-Prieto, supra note 21, at 259.
116 BANK OF AMERICA NT AND SA, Country Outlooks: Chile, WORLD
INFORMATION SERVICES, Mar. 1996.
117 See Roberto Zahler, The Background, Rationale, and Success of Chilean
Economic Policy, 16 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 275, 288 (1994).
11 BANK OFAMERICANT AND SA, supra note 116.
19 See WALDEN COUNTRY REPORTS, Chile, Jan. 30, 1995.
120 See Zahler, supra note 117, at 288.
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The Chilean privatized pension system has benefited the aver-
age person by providing retirement benefits, but has assisted in
the emerging capital market development of the country as a
whole. The revenue raised as a result of the system has provided
the funding to support the new infrastructure projects of Chile
and has stimulated national savings and investment.'2' Worker
self-control over their funds represents an important part of the
development of their confidence in the system, and in the gov-
ernment.1 2 By retirement, most workers do not have to make
extra investments to support themselves. At the same time, they
prepare for their future, they invest privately into the Chilean
market."2 The freedom of choice that the system gives to Chil-
ean people has been invaluable to many, providing "a solid foun-
dation for a more stable, free and prosperous society." 24
4.2. Disadvantages of the Privatization of Chile's Pension System
As beneficial as the system may sound for the Chilean popula-
tion, the system has not been implemented without some very
high costs. Administrative and advertising costs, competition
among the AFPs, and vulnerability to the risks inherent in pri-
vate market investment are just a few of the criticisms levied
against a privatized pension scheme.
One of the goals of the system was to take its administration
out of the hands of the government and place the control with
private investment companies."2 The effectiveness of this transfer
is questionable. Even though the government only funds ap-
proximately 7%126 of old-system pensions, the Ministry of Labor,
which regulates the pensions, still receives 27.1% of the consoli-
dated governmental budget" to fund the old pension system for
those who chose not to enter the new system when it was first of-
fered.' It seems improbable that 27.1% of the budget is actually
121 See Paskin, supra note 21, at 2208.
'2' See Diamond & Vald&-Prieto, supra note 21, at 259.
123 See 20/20: Retired and Rich, supra note 19.
124 Pinera, supra note 70.
125 See id.
16 See BUSTMENTE GERALDO, supra note 72, at 4.
1v See THE ECONOMIST INTELuGENCE UNIT, EIU Country Report 4k
Quarter 1997: Chile, Oct. 30, 1997, at 14. This percentage is by far the highest
in the budget and increased by 5.5% in 1998. See id.
128 See id
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funding the prior system's pensions, because while the population
has an average life expectancy of 74.6 years,' 29 only 7% of the
population remains on that system. It may be that the privatiza-
tion does not help lower income individuals who cannot ade-
quately contribute to their retirement.13 This certainly would
diminish the overall success of the Chilean approach.
The system's very high administrative costs for Chilean
workers represents one of the most problematic drawbacks.
Costs can run "as high as 30% to match similar coverage provided
at about half the cost by the U.S. Social Security system."
131
While the costs have not been prohibitive, they remain much
higher than many other systems, including that of United
States. 3 2 The system has been criticized by some as being over
five times as expensive as that of the United States, and perhaps
the most expensive in the world. 33 The administration costs per
effective affiliate (worker who engages in the system), while ac-
tive, are estimated at US$89.1 per year, which represents 2.94% of
average taxable earnings." 4  These costs are similar to those of
"very expensive government-managed systems." 3 s Yet, expensive
does not necessarily mean effective. Chilean administrative costs
tend to compare unfavorably with other "well-run unified gov-
ernment-managed systems.... 136
Delinquent contributions present another problem. "In 1994,
the Chilean pension fund management system released informa-
tion showing that 45% of their participants were delinquent in
making contributions, with 28% being more than a year behind
in payments." 3 ' This leads one to believe that without a manda-
tory withholding system, many people will likely spend the
129 See Chile, Kaleidoscope (ABC-Clio), Nov. 3, 1997, at 4.
130 See Paskin, supra note 21.
131 Mariana Talleda Gitomer, Privatization of Social Security, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 21, 1996, at B8.
132 See id. ("In the U.S., just one penny of every Social Security tax dollar
collected is used for administrative expenses. Overhead costs in Chile are esti-
mated to run as high as 30 cents on the dollar.").
133 See World Bank Reveals Chilean Pension System "More Expensive than in
USA," EL UNIVERSAL (Mexico), July 21, 1997 [hereinafter Wor Bank Reveals].
134 See Diamond & Vald6s-Prieto, supra note 21, at 260; see also World Bank
Reveals, supra note 133 (quoting similar statistics).
135 See Diamond & Valdes-Prieto, supra note 21, at 260.
136 See iL
13 Talleda Gitomer, supra note 131.
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tory withholding system, many people will likely spend the
money today rather than save for the future. Such paternalistic
concerns are warranted when considering the future strain that
would be placed upon the already soaring welfare expenses if
people who do not make payments need assistance beyond their
personal retirement plans.
The system has also been criticized for its relentless and, some
argue, fraudulent advertising campaigns.13 The money spent on
sales and marketing b7 the AFPs in this decade equals about half
of the AFPs revenue. 3 Marketing agents for each AFP take ad-
vantage of the fact that workers are permitted to transfer their
funds up to four times per year. Some promoters even pay work-
ers to transfer their accounts in order to receive their commis-
sion."4 Workers are constantly approached by agents using un-
ethical tactics in an effort to acquire customers. Employers are
also guilty of questionable tactics; some press employees to sign
up because some they receive kickbacks when their employees
sign up.14' In Mexico, many of the large banks and conglomer-
ates, which employ thousands of people, own AFPs and con-
stantly pressure their employees to join the AFP the the company
owns.14  Julio Bustamente, the principal regulator of the AFPs,
points out that if the marketers are able to share their commis-
sions with the worker by paying the worker to switch, then the
commissions must be too high. 43
The questionable methods used by the AFPs to gain addi-
tional customers highlights the fact that, in reality, the AFPs yield
very similar results due to the strict regulation. Thus, changes be-
tween AFP's are likely to yield very little benefit in practice.
The fluctuation of capital markets creates another problem
for the Chilean AFP system. Some argue that this problem is
overstated because, as a person gets closer to retirement, he or she
. See 20/20: Retired andRich, supra note 19.
139 See World Bank Reveals, supra note 133.
'4' Afores Request that Account Transfer Must be Done in Branch Office by
Worker, EL UNIVERSAL (Mexico), Sept. 22, 1997. In Mexico's attempt to
switch over to the new privatized pension system, the government imple-
mented a rule that all the transfers must be made in the branch of the AFP in
order to "avoid the corruption, falsification and wasteful transfer of accounts
that has appeared in Chile .... " Id.
141 See id.
142 See id.
143 See a
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cially stable investments.1" However, there is no insurance
against an extreme downturn in the market right before a person
retires.14 In defense of their system, Chilean pension authorities
suggest that in the event of a negative market fluctuation, workers
can avoid being left without retirement funds by simply waiting
until the market corrects itself to retire. This may be an unrealis-
tic solution, depending on the magnitude of the fluctuation.
Some have also suggested that the funds do not perform as well
overall as the Chilean pension authorities claim. One study
stated that the Chilean AEPs have been in negative figures for
two years (1995-97) and that the domestic savings that were part
of the plan's goals have yet to be realized.146 "The Chilean reality
indicates that the pensions obtained by this system are not better
than the earlier ones.""14 Apparently, only a very narrow group of
people can retire without having to depend upon some form of
governmental subsidization. 4 Also, according to one study, it is
impossible for the pensions to surpass the increase in productivity
of the country that may reach a maximum of 4%.149 The fact that
the funds continue to be so dependent upon the financial capacity
and standing of the country may be problematic in the future, as
every economy inevitably experiences cyclical booms and crashes.
5. APPLICATIONS FOR UNITED STATES SOCIAL SECURITY
POLICY AND REFORM
The lesson the United States can learn from the Chilean expe-
rience contains numerous complexities. The benefits appear to be
great since the system has supported an emerging economy with
new capital markets. The system appears to be experiencing
144 See 20/20: Retired andRich, supra note 19.
"If a person retires during a period of stock market crisis.., the
amount of money received will decrease from the affected shares ....
Chile/Economy Stock Market Drop in Chile May Affect the Retired, NoTIMEX
(Santiago), Oct. 28, 1997.
146 See Afores Defraud Workers and Cost Taxpayers 300 Million Dollars in
Advertising, EL UNIVERSAL (Mexico), Aug. 7, 1997. The article about the
fraudulent system is based upon statements made by a PRD deputy, Ricardo
Garcia Sainz, who was also the director general of the Mexican social security
system and a PRI member.
147 Modak, supra note 100. ("La realidad chilena indica que las pensiones
obtenidas por este sistema no son mejores que las anteriores.").
148 See 20/20: Retired and Rich, supra note 19.
149 See Modak, supra note 100.
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overall gains, and the freedom of choice and control over personal
capitalization seems invaluable. On the other hand, the system is
very expensive to administer, there are ethical business practice
problems with marketing the AFPs, the minimum pension ap-
pears to still be taking up a very large part of the budget, and the
risk of the market crashing and injuring the system could be very
real.
5.1. The United States' Social Security System's History and
Projections
Throughout Social Security's history, one factor remains con-
stant: costs keep rising. In 1935 President Franklin D. Roosevelt
responded to the Great Depression by passing the Social Security
Act, which provided millions of workers with retirement bene-
fits. 5" Four years later, the benefits were extended to widows,
spouses, and dependents, and the portion of the federal budget
spent on Social Security was under 5%."' In 1956, Eisenhower
mandated essentially universal coverage, added disability insur-
ance, and lowered the eligibility age of women from sixty-five to
sixty-two. The portion of the federal budget then spent on Social
Security payments was just under 10%.152 In 1965, Lyndon John-
son created Medicare, the first of the Baby Boomers entered the
labor force, and the social insurance portion of the federal budget
rose to just under 20%.' Inflation outpaced wages in the 1970s,
which resulted in a significant drain on the Social Security trust
fund. In 1983, Ronald Reagan's reforms were implemented to
guarantee the program's existence for seventy-five years." 4 None-
theless, in 1994, the Social Security Trustees predicted that the
trust fund would be completely drained by 2029.' Today, more
150 See H.R. DOc. NO. 105-72,supra note 11.
151 See Robert J. Samuelson, Social Security: A Program's Rise, NEWSWEEK,
jan. 20,1997.
152 See id.
153 See id.
151 See id see also CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC., SOCIAL SECURITY
AND RETIREMENT: PRivATE GOALS, PUBuC POUCY (1983) (quoting Repre-
sentative Conable, who stated, "It may not be a work of art, but it is an artful
work... It will do what it was supposed to do... It will save the nation's ba-
sic social insurance system from imminent disaster.").
155 SeeH.R. DOc. No. 105-72,supra note 11.
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than 20% of the federal budget is spent on Social Security pay-
ments. 
1 6
With the rising costs of Social Security, why is it that the in-
creased spending is leading the fund into depletion? It appears
that the answer lies in the fundamental structure of the system
which has grown too large to support itself. A general explana-
tion of the system is worth advancing. The Social Security and
Medicare taxes that a worker pays are divided among several trust
funds. There are two Social Security trust funds: the Federal Old-
Age and Survivor's Insurance (" OASI") Trust Fund that is used to
pay for retirement and survivor's benefits, and the Federal Dis-
ability Insurance ("DI") Trust Fund that pays benefits to disabled
people and their families."' 7 There are also two Medicare trust
funds that include the Federal Hospital Insurance ("HI") Trust
Fund that pays for the services covered under the hospital provi-
sions of Medicare, and the Federal Supplementary Medical Insur-
ance ("SMI") Trust Fund that covers the medical insurance provi-
sions of Medicare."5 ' The 7.65% that is deducted from a worker's
income is allocated to each of the funds in the following manner:
5.35% to OASI, .85% to DI, and 1.45% to HI. 59 Social Security
taxes are not used to fund SMI, which is funded by the General
Fund of the Treasury and by premiums paid by enrollees. 6
The Board of Trustees of OASDI, consisting of the Secretary
of Treasury, Secretary of Labor, Secretary of Health and Human
Services, and the Commissioner of Social Security, regulates the
trust funds.1 61 At first, the fund was a pay-as-you-go system, 62 but
in 1983, the program implemented a "partial reserve" system to
save more money than it paid out to build up reserves to maintain
the system.1 63 As a result of the 1983 reforms, the government
deposits Social Security tax revenues into the trust funds, and any
money not used to pay benefits is invested into U.S. government
156 See Samuelson, Social Security: A Program's Rise, supra note 151.
17 SeeH.R. DOc. NO. 105-72,supra note 11.
158 See id.
159 See id.
160 See id.
161 See id.
162 See 20/20: Retired and Rich, supra note 19 (critiquing the United States'
system, Dr. Jose Pinera stated that the main problem with our system was that
it was a pay-as-you-go system).
163 See CONGRESSIONAL QuARTERLY INC., supra note 154, at 68-69.
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bonds, so as to build a reserve.' These investments yield a sub-
stantial amount of interest, $38.7 billion dollars in 1996, repre-
senting "an effective annual interest rate of 7.6%." 165
Although many often assume that the government used the
Social Security funds' money for other government projects,166
the present Social Security administration insists that the rumor is
false and instead due to confusion over the trust fund investment
mechanisms." The government borrows money from the Social
Security fund and then pays back the funds with interest at only
2.2%. Considering how long it probably takes to pay back the
amount borrowed, the interest most likely does not even come
close to making up the return that the fund should receive. The
problem is "when we [the government] take $100 billion a year
out of Social Security and put it into debt, then, of course, when
the time comes for that debt to have to be repaid, we have to do
something quite different" 168 than borrowing again from Social
Security to pay its own debt back.
5.2. The United States' Social Security Crisis
No matter what the Social Security Administration contends
about the use of the funds, or why the large interest revenues dis-
appear, one thing is certain and cannot be denied: Social Security
is dying. The techniques implemented over the years to salvage
the Social Security system are nothing more than life-support.
According to the 1997 OASDI Trustees Report, the projec-
tions for the trust funds are increasingly dismal.6  The Trustees
conducted their investigation under three sets of cost assump-
164 See H.R. DOc. No. 105-72,supra note 11.
165 Id.
166 See 20/20: Retired and Rich, supra note 19 (Reporter John Stossel stated,
"Congress takes every penny you put in and spends it now, paying off today's
retirees. Then they spend whatever's left over covering other government
promises- welfare farm supports, whatever.").
167 See id. When Social Security invests in government bonds, the gov-
ernment uses that money for other purposes. The Social Security Administra-
tion claims that the government always "makes good on its obligations" and
pays the trust fund back with interest. Id.
168 144 CONG. REC. S2152 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1998) (statement of Sen.
Thomas).
169 SeeH.R. Doc. No. 105-72,supra note 11.
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tions: low, intermediate, and high.' The major findings of the
report are grouped into short-range results (i.e., the next ten
years) and long-range results (i.e., the next seventy-five years)." 1
"The combined OASI and DI Trust Funds, as well as each
fund separately, are adequately financed and meet the short-range
test for financial adequacy."" Both funds' assets are expected to
rise rapidly in the next ten years, although it is predicted that the
DI fund's assets relative to annual expenditures will begin to de-
cline as early as 2003.' The combined assets of the funds will
likely increase from $567 billion at the end of the 1996 to $1,459
billion at the beginning of 2006."M
The results for the long-range projections change radically af-
ter the ten-year period. On a combined and an individual basis,
the OASI and DI Trust Funds are "not 'in close actuarial balance'
over the next 75 years."7 The report further noted that,
With the retirement of the "baby-boom" generation start-
ing in about 2010, OASDI costs will increase rapidly rela-
tive to the taxable earnings of workers. By the end of the
75-year projection period, the OASDI cost rate is esti-
mated to reach 19.2 percent under the intermediate as-
sumptions, resulting in an annual deficit of about 5.9 per-
cent. Annual tax revenue would be sufficient to cover
only about 2/3 of annual expenditures at the end of the
75-year period. The cost of the OASDI program is esti-
mated to rise from its current level of 4.7 percent of gross
domestic product (GDP) to 6.7 percent of GDP... and
the annual deficit is estimated to be 2.1 percent of GDP at
the end of the 75-year projection period. 6
170 See id. The Administration has not specified exactly how these costs
are determined, but for analysis purposes, this paper depends upon the same
intermediate cost assumptions as the Administration does.
171 See id.
172 Id.
17 See id.
174 See id.
175 Id.
176 Id.
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The report suggests that the combination of people having
longer life expectancies, the retirement of the Baby-Boomers, and
the too-late decision to increase the revenue reservoir has left So-
cial Security powerless to sustain its beneficiaries."7 "For years,
there were more than 40 workers for every Social Security recipi-
ent, but now there are just three workers paying for each re-
tiree." ' By the time most middle-aged workers retire, there will
be only two workers paying for each recipient. 9 According to
the Social Security administration's "Highlights of Social Security
Data" for November 1998, 44,211,900 people received Social Se-
curity benefits, which is an increase of 269,400 or 0.6% since No-
vember 1997.180 Benefits paid out from the Social Security Trust
Funds in November 1998 totaled $31.3 billion, with average
monthly benefits for November 1998 at $770 for retired work-
ers.
181
5.3. Answers for the United States
The Social Security System must undergo a drastic reform.
Some of the possibilities include different forms of privatiza-
tion,182 adjusting the consumer price index to match the annual
cost-of-living increase, raising the taxes of wealthier recipients,
and increasing the benefit eligibility age to parallel higher life ex-
pectancies."'
Some politicians are attempting to convince the public that
the "balanced budget" agreement will be the answer to saving So-
cial Security, since it will generate revenues that may be invested
into the trust funds. 4 During President Clinton's State of the
Union Address in January 1999, he proudly announced that he
and Congress had finally balanced the budget "[f]or the first time
177 See id.
17 20/20: Retired and Rich, supra note 19.
179 See id.
180 See Social Security Administration, Highlights of Social Security Data
(last modified Nov. 1998) < http://www.socialsecurity.gov >.
181 See id.
182 See infra section 1, introduction, discussing the privatization recom-
mendations of the OASDI Trustees.
183 See Evan Thomas & Rich Thomas, Social Insecurity, NEWSWEEK, Jan.
20, 1997, at 20.
184 See Robert J. Samuelson, Balancing Act, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 11, 1997, at
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in three decades .... [f]rom a deficit of $290 billion in 1992, we
had a surplus of $70 billion last year. And now we are on course
for budget surpluses for the next 25 years."' But the skepticism
about the balanced budget plan itself casts a large shadow of
doubt over its ability to fund Social Security.186 Also, questions
arise as to where the balanced budget funding came from, and
whether it might have come from the surpluses generated from
Social Security itself.
1 7
The other aforementioned options, excluding privatization,
are, again, characteristic temporary "band-aids" that the United
States government places upon Social Security. The consumer
price index ("CPI") adjustment in benefits results in the over-
compensation of recipients, since the adjustment overestimates
the cost of living expenditure by 1.1%."'8 Decreasing Social Secu-
rity benefits also is not a realistic option. Moreover, decreasing
benefits is unfair because it affects the oldest beneficiaries, who
are the least able to protect themselves and plan for the futures
without the guarantee of Social Security." 9 Also, increasing the
age at which people should receive Social Security assumes that
people are living longer, and, therefore, they should work longer.
What is ignored is that with longer life-spans comes a greater like-
185 President William J. Clinton, supra note 9, at A22.
186 See Samuelson, Balancing Act, supra note 184. Samuelson suggests that
the balanced budget agreement is copl-etely unrealistic and is solely a result of
a strong economy. See id. The guidelines are not strict and, therefore, will
likely not be adhered to in the probable event that the economy encounters a
recession. See id, see also Joe Klein, Pretty Close to Awful, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 16,
1996, at 51 (quoting Nebraska Senator Bob Kerry of the Kerry-Danforth
Commission Who, in noting that the possible balanced budget schemes of 1996
had $60 to $80 billion in unspecified- discretionary spending cuts, stated, "To
do it, you're going to have to cut the space station, Energy, a lot of other
things we're never gonna do.").
187 See William G. Dauster, Protecting Social Security and Medicare, 33
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 461, 479-80 (1996) (explaining that "the availability of the
Social Security surpluses makes the unified budget deficit smaller than it oth-
erwise would be. Thus, some accuse policy-makers of using Social Security
surpluses to hide the true size of the budget deficit.").
188 See Thomas & Thomas, supra note 183. A commission of economic
experts in December 1996 found that the CPI overstates the actual annual cost-
of-living increase by 1.1%. See id. New York's Senior Senator Daniel Patrick
Moynihan has recommended that the United States decrease the CPI, to which
all government benefits are tied, by this 1.1% to match the actual cost-of-living.
See id
189 See 141 CONG. REC. S5018 (daily ed. Mar. 31, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Moynihan).
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lihood of long-term illness, which also costs a great deal of
money. Although it is desirable to encourage the elderly to con-
tinue working so that the funds are not depleted as quickly, 9 ° the
resulting significant age increase would not only be unpopular,
but would eliminate the concept of retirement because it inher-
ently expects workers to work until they die. Raising the taxes of
the wealthy to pay for Social Security is a possibility, but allow-
ing the rich young to pay for the elderly poor creates a welfare
state with few incentives to work until retirement for either class.
5.4. President Clinton's Plan to Save Social Security
In his January 1999 State of the Union Address, President
Clinton set out a plan of Social Security reform which included
partial privatization of the funds. The plan consists of the follow-
ing elements:
1. Transfer 62% of the $4.4 trillion projected budget surpluses
over the next 15 years to the Social Security System. It is
planned that this will total over $2.7 trillion;19'
2. Invest $700 billion of this $2.7 trillion, into the stock mar-
ket;19
3. Reserve 15% of the suTlus, which totals $650 billion, to as-
sist the Medicare system;' 3
4. Devote 11% of the surplus, which will likely total $500 bil-
lion, to voluntary government-subsidized retirement ac-
counts;194 and
5. Use $2 trillion of the surplus during the next fifteen years
to resuscitate Social Security by reducing the national debt. 5
At first glance, the plan sounds promising, and indeed, is a
step in the right direction. However, the program suffers from
very crucial flaws that, if not addressed, could thrust the Social
19 See Jonathan Barry Forman, Reforming Social Security to Encourage the
Elderly to Work, 9 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 289 (1998).
191 See Michael M. Weinstein, Clinton's Plan for Social Security Has Its Back-
ers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1999, at A21.
192 See id.
193 See James Bennett, Unbowed, Clinton Presses Social Security Plan, N.Y.
TIMEs, JAN. 20, 1999, at A20.
194 See id.
19 See Richard W. Stevenson, Clinton Social Security Plan Runs into Oppo-
sition, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1999, at A19.
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Security system back into jeopardy, possibly in an even more dire
situation than it presently faces.
5.4.1. Possible Problems with the Clinton Social Security
Reforms
One may first question exactly where this budget surplus is
coming from. As noted before, it is possible that the surplus ac-
tually comes from the funds of Social Security and is replaced
with IOUs from the government. "Notwithstanding the clear in-
tention of Congress to exclude Social Security from the budget,
the President's budget regularly includes Social Security balances
in its most prominent displays of the deficit.""19 Also, under Sec-
tion 710 of the Social Security Act, receipts and disbursements of
the Medicare HI Trust Fund should not be included in either the
presidential or the congressional budgets after the 1993 fiscal
year.9 Yet Medicare has often appeared in deficit calculations
and in total budget descriptions despite this requirement.'98 Even
if the surplus is not from the maneuvering of the trust funds, to
project a surplus for the next fifteen years assumes too much.
Michael J. Boskin, chief economist to President Bush, called
Clinton's'plan "politically nave," stating that "Congress... will
simply not stand by and let huge surpluses accumulate without
spending them."' The fact that it has taken thirty years to bal-
ance the budget alone is testimony to the difficulty of this task.
Assuming that the surplus materializes, how will the govern-
ment proceed in the stock market? This raises three problems:
(1) volatility of the market and its impact on the government's
ability to pay benefits in the face of a market crash; (2) conflict of
interest with the companies, part of which the government will
now own; and (3) proper insulation from Congressional meddling
with the funds.
Those concerned about the volatility of the stock market need
not be concerned about benefits based on the bull or bear market,
as the benefits will still be determined by lifelong earnings.2J Yet
196 Dauster, supra note 187, at 495 n.166 (citing OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT
& BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 15 (1996)).
197 See id. at 495.
198 See id. at 502.
19 Weinstein, supra note 191.
200 See id.
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this raises the question of how exactly the government will pay
these benefits if the market crashes, which, it may at some point.
The plan assumes a 6.75% average annual return on its portfolio,
which is equivalent to the historical return from 1959-96.20' The
investments would generate 3.8% higher return than average re-
turn on the Treasury bonds in which the trust fund is now in-
vested.2 2 The plan makes perfect sense, unless the surplus does
not materialize soon enough and the market crashes early. Once
the money is invested for a few years, and if the average return
does, in fact, reach 6.75%, the fund could weather a decline for a
short period.
Of greater import is the government's new financial interest
in the companies in which it will invest. Texas Republican Rep-
resentative Bill Archer, who is chairman of the House Ways and
Means Committee, complained, "[G]overnment-controlled in-
vestment in markets is contrary to free enterprise and it will open
the doors to all kinds of mischief involving government dictates,
favoritism and cronyism."" 3 For example, some note the clear
possibility of a conflict between the government litigating a case
against a company, while it owns stock in that company via So-
cial Security investments.2 4
Issues such as how the government will proceed in proxy mat-
ters, including mergers and acquisitions and executive compensa-
tion, also raise concerns.2 " The Fund's ownership of approxi-
mately 4 to 5% of the value of Wall Street shares24 may subject
the government to increased lobbying, causing it to buy shares in
environmentally-friendly or special interest companies once one
has become a potential shareholder. However, these companies
may not yield the anticipated 6.75% return.
The government must insulate itself from congressional med-
dling with the funds2'7 and invest in index or mutual funds that
201 See Stevenson, supra note 195. The White House did not include the
years 1997-98 in determining this average, due to the unusual rise in the stock
market. See id.
202 See id.
203 1L
204 See idL; Gretchen Morgenson, Wall Street Not Exactly Bullish on Plan to
Aid Social Security, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1999, at A19.
205 See id.
206 See Weinstein, supra note 191.
20 See David E. Rosenbaum, Greenspan Sees Harm in Proposal, N.Y. TIMES
Jan. 21, 1999, at Al, A19 (quoting Federal Reserve Board Chairman, Alan
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track the historical average. If Clinton's plan succeeds, govern-
ment involvement in companies will not be a problem because it
will not own a large enough stake to control any corporation. Of
course, exercising control over Congress is difficult, and Clinton
has yet to explain how the "independent" board would be se-
lected and monitored.
In addition, commentators have criticized President Clinton's
proposal for the private Universal Savings Accounts ("USA").0
Under the USA program, each worker would receive a flat sum
to open an account (for example, $100).209 The worker would
then have the option of contributing to his or her account.21 The
government would match these personal contributions in part,
perhaps in the form of a tax credit.
Criticism of Clinton's USA plan centers on the origin of the
funds to set up the accounts. Many also question the public's in-
clination to contribute to such accounts, especially if the subsidy
is given in the form of an abstract tax cut that might be almost
meaningless to poorer workers. The plan may fall victim to the
same savings aversion that the Chilean system suffered from-
people would rather spend today than save for tomorrow.
It is difficult to predict whether the lack of guidelines would
render the USA accounts useless. If the government matches
workers' contributions with meaningful cash contributions, one
with a return that would exceed more than the average savings
account (such as a mutual fund or index), the account system
could be a step in the right direction.
The Clinton Administration proposal provokes a necessary
debate on the issue of privatization. Although such a dialogue is
desperately needed, concerns surrounding the vast assumptions
upon which the program rests remain. For Clinton's proposal to
succeed, a surplus must materialize, Congress must not interfere,
people must want to contribute, the market must not crash, and
an independent board must be set up and properly monitored.
This leaves aside the congressional deadlocks that will inevitably
ensue regarding implementation.
Greenspan, as stating, "I do not believe that it is politically feasible to insulate
such huge funds from government direction.").
20 See Bennett, supra note 193.
209 See id.
210 See id
211 See id.
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6. POSSIBLE APPLICATIONS OF THE CHILEAN AFPS TO THE
UNITED STATES' SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM
The United States clearly takes the projections of the 1991
OASDI Trustees Report seriously, recognizing the need for
change. Partial privatization might be just the right makeover
mechanism.
Clinton's scheme for partial privatization makes an analysis
of the implementation of a system mirroring Chile's prudent. In
Chile, privatization appears to have been a positive experience.
Prior to privatization, the country was in a state of political up-
heaval. Chilean citizens never knew where their money would
end up from one regime to the next, and the country's overall de-
velopment lagged. Pinochet's military takeover offered an oppor-
tunity for an easy transition because of the dictator's totalitarian
control over the Chilean Congress. The privatization of other
industries paved the way for pension reform. The government
was able to restructure the debt of the country, allowing the
AFPs to invest in the debt instruments and the infrastructure pro-
ject sales. The two sides of the transactions supported each other.
The United States' ability to implement such a system is ques-
tionable for a number of reasons. First, the United States is not
similarly situated to Chile either politically or economically. Po-
litically, the United States must contend with a partisan Congress.
Its two party political process, though the foundation of our
democratic society, undermines many efforts at reform that
might prove beneficial to the country.212 Public support plays an
extremely significant role in Social Security reform. The existing
program is very popular,"1 and many politicians are reluctant to
risk political ramifications from powerful lobbyist groups such as
the AARP and the Grey Panthers.214
As mentioned in Section 1, Baby Boomers have accepted the
fate of Social Security and have prepared for "individual secu-
rity.""' The Chilean government dealt with similar resignation
and resistance by making the switch to privatization optional.
Those who were already receiving benefits were allowed to con-
212 See Thomas & Thomas, supra note 183.
213 See id.
214 See 20/20: Retired andRich, supra note 19.
215 See infra Section 1.
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tinue to do so under the old program." 6 Those who chose to
change over were given a coupon that represented the amount of
money that they had already contributed to the existing system.217
This approach allowed presently retired people to continue to re-
ceive their benefits under OASDI. Since those who "cash-out"
receive only a coupon, there should still be enough money in the
system to support those who are now retired. Yet, whether there
will be enough money left in the system to redeem those coupons
when the time comes remains an open question.
Economically, the United States is in a much different posi-
tion than Chile, especially the Chile of 1980. Like most of the
countries that have privatized, including Argentina, Mexico,
Hungary and, now, Poland, Chile is a third world country.
218
This suggests that the underdeveloped nature of third world
countries may be an important factor in privatization. The fiscal
tightening required to create a budgetary surplus, including bor-
rowing, tax cuts, and assets sales, may not be realistic in a mature
industrial economy, like that of the United States.
U.S. public sentiment against increases in the federal deficit
would make borrowing extremely unpopular. Today, Chile faces
the problem of its "deficit in invisibles," which is expected to
produce a current account deficit of $4.3 billion in 1998 and grow
to "a worrying $5.9 billion (6% of GDP) in 1999." 2 9 The United
States' 1998 current account balance deficit is estimated at 2% of
GDP.' 0 The borrowing that might be necessary to fund full pri-
vatization would entrench the country in further debt and in-
crease our already formidable public external debt of $1,132 bil-
lion in 1996." Despite the commitment to a balanced budget and
the expectation that "the deficit [will] fall over time in both
nominal terms and as a share of GDP, the federal government
will still be running a deficit in 2002. " ' Considering that the
216 See Diamond & Valdes-Prieto, supra note 21, at 275.
217 See id
218 See 20/20: Retired and Ricb, supra note 19.
219 THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, CROSSBORDER MONITOR:
CHILE, Jan. 7, 1998.
220 See THE ECONOMIST INTELUGENCE UNIT, COUNTRY FORECAST:
UNITED STATES, July 31, 1997.
221 See id.
m THE ECONOMIST INTELLGENCE UNIT, CROSSBORDER MONITOR:
USA, May 7, 1997.
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OASDI funds are expected to start depleting in 2006,' balancing
the budget only after 2002 seems to be to little too late.
Additionally, the United States is disinclined to privatize its
infrastructure. Some suggest that the success of the privatization
of the Chilean pension system had little to do with the privatiza-
tion of just the pension system. The private savings of individuals
had little to do with the internal savings of the country; the real
reason for the economic boom in the country was the liberaliza-
tion of economic policy. '
The United States is not in a period of economic transition.
There is no movement towards a liberalization of its economic
policy. The Chilean transition was financed in a manner that the
United States probably could not afford. Because of its closed
economic structure, Chile was able to restrict its activity signifi-
cantly. The United States' position as an international market
would likely prohibit adoption of a similar privatized system.
Efforts to entirely eliminate the OASDI Trust Funds will
probably prove to be both unpopular and economically unrealis-
tic. However, it is possible that partial privatization of the
United States Social Security program could be beneficial. The
OASDI Advisory Council has suggested three sets of recommen-
dations to restore the long-range actuarial balance of the OASDI
system.' The first approach involves maintaining the current
tax and benefits structure while investing a small portion of the
trust fund assets in private equities, as suggested in Clinton's pro-
posal. This approach would fail because it is not aggressive
enough. As mentioned previously, congressional scuffles would
begin over how much and what types of investment instruments
should be allowed. The level of United States' pension funds
would be only marginally affected and wind up with relatively
few dollars being invested privately.
The second option is to privatize a significant portion of the
current program by directing five percentage points of each
worker's contributions (taken out of the present 12.4% contribu-
tion rate) to a "Personal Security Account." 6 Transition costs
would require additional funding equivalent to 1.52% of taxable
223 See H.R. Doc. NO. 105-72,supra note 11.
" See Hugo K. Mena, Reforma Provisional y Ahorro Interno: La Experien-
cia Chilena, ESTE PAIS (Mexico), Nov. 1, 1997.
2 Seei-
26 H.R. Doc. No. 105-72,supra note 11.
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earnings over the first seventy-two years.' This approach raises
concerns as to where the United States would obtain this funding.
Certain of the aforementioned "tweaks" that Congress is consid-
ering implementing may create necessary funds. The solution of
adjusting the consumer price index 1.1% to match inflation
"could save $1 trillion in 12 years [and] [b]enefits checks would
still rise with the true cost of living .... ,2 Additionally, the age
of entitlements could be raised to sixty-seven or sixty-eight.
When the age of sixty-five was chosen in 1935, the average life
span was sixty-two; it is now seventy-six. 9 These changes, com-
bined with a true effort to balance the budget, could fund the
transition.
Partial privatization has been suggested to the Senate Budget
Committee Task Force on Social Security by Sylvester Schieber,
Ph.D., director of research at Watson Wyatt Worldwide. 0 Dr.
Schieber reported-that the Social Security rate of return is "less
than the intermediate government bond rate of return, essentially
the most conservative alternative investment vehicle available to
workers."231 Thus, United States workers are being forced to in-
vest their employment earnings into a fund with lower returns
than those received from investments in private insurance com-
panies. The Watson Wyatt analysis concludes that the "current
system can be restructured to give workers a mix of individual ac-
counts and a reduced level of Social Security benefits. This would
ameliorate the down-side risks of a fully privatized system for
low-wage laborers, while continuing to provide potentially in-
creased rates of return for many workers."' This approach
combines the best of both worlds without the prohibitively high
transition costs.
The third approach recommended by the Advisory Commit-
tee is to scale back benefits so that they may be financed by the
See id.
, Thomas & Thomas, supra note 183.
-9 See id.
230 See Social Security Rates of Return Shortchange Workers: Watson Wyatt
Expert Testifies Before Senate on Social Security Reform (last visited Apr. 1, 1999)
<http://www.prnewswire.com>. Watson Wyatt Worldwide is a leading
globai management consulting firm with more than 5,000 associates in thirty-
six countries.
231 Id.
Z2 Id.
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current 12.4% contribution, followed by the establishment of a
defined contribution benefit plan (an individual account) for each
worker. 3 The account would be created through an additional
1.6% mandatory contribution to an investment account managed
by the federal government. Unfortunately, scaling back benefits
to accommodate the 12.4% rate while demanding an additional
1.6% contribution is potentially problematic. Moreover, the
1.6% increase appears too modest to truly change a worker's re-
tirement fund, especially if it is to be managed by the federal gov-
ernment. The fund probably would parallel the present system
because the OASDI trust fund invests in the most conservative of
all investments: domestic bonds.
The public is unlikely to support a program that requires
larger individual contributions for the government to invest as it
deems fit. The Chilean system is successful, in large part, because
people exercise control over their own investments. ' Allowing
U.S. workers to direct their money into a personal security ac-
count could promote savings and create further incentives to
work. Such individual involvement would eliminate feelings of
helplessness that arise from the lack of control over the individual
12.4% contribution.
The United States should look to the example of the United
Kingdom, where in 19860 over 800/6 of the population chose to
privatize their pensions. The U.K.'s Social Security Act reduced
the required worker contributions, allowing them, instead, to
participate in the approved Personal Pension Scheme (PPS) of the
worker's own choosing."7 While the United Kingdom's system is
new and the economic stature of the country is quite distinct
from the United States', the U.K. example does provide evidence
2" See H.R. Doc. No. 105-72, supra note 11.
' See 20/20: Retired and Rich, supra note 19, at 12-13. Fred Salloway, a
writer for union publications, asserted that the Chilean system was a failure for
the average Chilean. John Stossel interviewed a number of Chilean citizens
and one stated, "Today's system is better because they explain where the
money is. You can see what's happening with your money.' The feeling of
control over a worker's money and his/her investments is extremely impor-
tant in evaluating a Social Security System. See generally Symposium, Private
Pensions and the Public Interest: A Symposium Sponsored ly the American Enter
prise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington D.C. (1970).
" See Paskin, supra note 21, at 2220.
236 See 20/20: Retired and Rich, supra note 19.
17 See Social Security Act, 1986, ch. 50 (Eng.).
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that privatization may work in an industrialized, mature econ-
omy.
7. CONCLUSION
Reports by the Advisory Council, Watson Wyatt, and the
Kerry-Danforth Commission lead to the conclusion that partial
privatization would best serve American workers. 8 The transi-
tion to partial privatization, while neither simple nor quick, is
necessary. Hopefully, when implementing the system, the mem-
bers of Congress can avoid partisan divisions, looking instead to
the needs of their constituents. While some argue that the transi-
tion could not be a sweeping one," 9 the OASDI Reports indicate
that the United States has very little time left.2' The U.S. must
use the balanced budget, tax cuts and additional fiscal tightening
measures to provide for its citizens' futures. Privatization of the
system could help by creating incentives to save and lowering the
overall burden on the federal government, thereby reducing defi-
cit spending and possibly even eliminating the welfare state as it
exists today.
While Clinton's plan is a positive step, the United Savings Ac-
counts must require a mandatory contribution which varies in an
amount depending on income and allows the investor to control
the proceeds. Because most wealthier workers have already in-
vested in the market and obtained 401k and other IRA plans,
education must be an integral part of this reform, as those who
most need to invest are often those unfamiliar with investment
strategies. Strict guidelines and limitations on government bor-
rowing from the Social Security Trust Funds must be imposed. If
a surplus materializes, it must stay in the funds to allow the 6.75%
return to grow and to protect the fund in case of a market crash.
The government must also be committed to insulating the fund
from investments motivated by favoritism or cronyism. A large
investment interest in one financially weak company could de-
stroy the fund entirely.
Privatization would open the financial capital markets to
more people, minimizing the capitalist image of the wealthy get-
ting wealthier. Replacing this tradition would be a better one
" For a comprehensive analysis of the proffered plans, see infra Section 6.
219 See Paskin, supra note 21, at 2222.
240 See infra graph at 115.
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with workers taking responsibility for investing their money in
their own futures, not someone else's.
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